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Abstract: 
 
This paper provides new evidence on the role of official development assistance in program 
implementation.  Governments and donors around the world are promoting participatory 
development and community management programs that transfer responsibilities and rights to 
local communities.  Large-scale implementation of these schemes requires significant funding 
from multiple sources.  I consider a uniform institutional reform in Nepal and find that the scope 
of program implementation and the characteristics of new institutions vary across types and 
sources of aid.  In my analysis, I develop a geographic matching estimator that compares 
adjacent communities receiving different types of assistance. This heterogeneity in institutions 
associated with funding that I find in this paper complicates the program evaluation problem and 
may impact the success of the reform.   
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1. Introduction 
What role does official development assistance (ODA) play in program implementation 
in an aid recipient country?  This question has received surprisingly little attention from 
academic economists.  A large literature considers the determinants of aid flows, but these 
authors focus entirely on cross-country comparisons.1  Similarly, many researchers consider 
program implementation and evaluation within countries, but these studies tend to ignore the role 
of ODA in program implementation.  An aid recipient country receives ODA in the form of 
program or project assistance (Singer 1965).2   An aid donor provides program aid directly to the 
aid recipient for the recipient to use and administer; project aid funds the operation of specific 
projects.  A donor country exerts greater control and influence in the use of project aid.  Hence a 
donor is more likely to provide project assistance if the donor has preferences about how a 
program is implemented or concerns about the use of program funds. 
This paper studies the impact of development assistance on the implementation of a 
large-scale institutional reform.  Devolution of central government programs to more localized 
institutions is a primary aim of contemporary development policy under the moniker 
“Participatory Development.”  Nowhere has the push for the establishment of local institutions 
been more prominent than in the transfer of local environmental resources to rural communities.  
The famous "Tragedy of the Commons" can be formulated as the failure of existing institutional 
rules to manage the commons.3  Given both the importance of the environment to household 
welfare and the high international profile of environmental issues, local common property is 
being transferred to local communities throughout the world.  A vast case study literature argues 
that the success or failure of these common property management regimes depends in part on the 
design and characteristics of these new institutions.4  The establishment of local institutions to 
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manage resources is time consuming and costly.  Existing national institutions often lack the 
incentives to change themselves.  Consequently, outside development assistance plays a key role 
in encouraging and financing the creation of local institutions to manage environmental 
resources.  This paper considers an example from Nepal where it appears that the source and 
type of ODA responsible for funding the construction of these new institutions impacts both how 
vigorously new institutions are created and the characteristics of the newly created local 
institutions. 
The analysis of this paper focuses on a massive institutional reform of Nepal's forestry 
sector.  In 1993, Nepal began to transfer all of its forestland from the central government to local 
communities by creating local forest user groups.  Project and program aid from multiple sources 
fund the transfer of forestland to local communities in Nepal.  This study finds that some donors 
are more active in creating forest user groups, and these donors generate groups with different 
physical characteristics (number of participants, physical area) than groups created by less active 
donors.  However, the type or source of aid in a given location has not changed since the transfer 
of forestland began in 1993.  Potentially, omitted differences in the geographic location of 
different donors could plague conclusions based on comparing the implementation of the transfer 
of forestland across aid sources.  In order to minimize the importance of unobserved differences 
between districts, I explore the robustness of my findings by focusing on communities that 
border each other on opposite sides of a district boundary.  These communities are likely to have 
similar unobserved characteristics but differ in the type (program or project) and source of aid 
used to fund the creation of forest user groups.  This approach to omitted differences in the cross-
section is similar to that of Card and Krueger (1994) and Holmes (1998).5  Card and Krueger 
(1994) compare fast food restaurants on opposite sides of a state border when one state increases 
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its minimum wage.  Holmes (1998) studies the impact of right to work laws on the location of 
manufacturing in the U.S. by selecting a sample of counties across state boundaries with 
different right to work laws.  In this study, I modify this methodology slightly.  Both Card and 
Krueger and Holmes select adjacent locations and analyze program effects under the assumption 
that the treatment and control groups are similarly distributed in space.  In this study, rather than 
relying on this assumption, I use nearest neighbor matching of geographic neighbors.  Matching 
permits a weaker identification assumption.  I assume that in expectation, differences in 
unobserved characteristics are smallest between nearest neighbors.  As in Card and Krueger 
(1994) and Holmes (1998), this identification assumption is not testable in the available data.  
Nevertheless, it is consistent with the history of geographic boundaries in Nepal discussed in 
Koran (1960).6  The results from geographic matching corroborate many of the differences 
associated with sources of aid that I observe in a descriptive, district level analysis. 
 The finding that the implementation of an institutional reform depends on the type and 
source of ODA has several implications.  First, since ODA is largely ignored in program 
evaluations, this paper highlights a potential omitted variable in program evaluations when 
development assistance plays a role in program implementation.  Second, Singer (1965) argues 
that if government funds are fungible, the labeling of specific funds as project aid does not 
impact the implementation of government programs.7  In the example of this paper, the attributes 
of newly created institutions differ between areas with different sources of project and program 
aid.  Third, this paper contributes to the debate about the sensitivity of official development 
assistance to recipient need discussed in Mosley (1985) and Jay and Michalopoulos (1987).8  If 
the matching assumptions are correct (adjacent communities on opposite sides of district 
boundaries have similar community and forest characteristics), then I observe large variations in 
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program implementation that have nothing to do with recipient need.  The involvements of 
different projects in different areas are historically determined.  Thus, these within country 
findings are consistent with Alesina and Dollar’s (1998) cross-country study that emphasizes the 
importance of historical relationships in aid flows.9  Fourth, Burnside and Dollar (2000) use 
cross-country evidence to show that aid is more effective when it is conditioned on “good” 
policies and institutions.10  This paper emphasizes the impact of aid on the policies and 
institutions that exist within a country.  
  The paper is organized as follows.  The next section provides background on the 
operation of official development assistance in the institutional reform considered in this paper.  
Section 3 introduces the data and develops the methodology of this study.  Section 4 considers 
the relationship between ODA and the scale of program implementation.  Section 5 considers 
how institutional characteristics are influenced by the source of funding for the institutional 
improvements.  Section 5 concludes. 
2. Background 
In 1996, ninety-eight percent of rural households in the hill and mountain areas of Nepal 
use wood as their primary fuel in meeting their household energy needs.11  Because of the 
dependence of its population on forests and the potential value of its forest resources, forest 
policy has always been a high profile issue in Nepal.  Forest policy has undergone several major 
revisions in the last forty years that have led to its current institutional setting where forest policy 
is funded by several different types and sources of assistance. 
In 1957, all forests over 1.25 hectares in the hill and mountain areas of Nepal were 
nationalized.12  Four years later, the Forest Act was passed creating the administrative structure 
that exists today.   Nepal is divided into 5 development regions, 14 administrative zones, and 75 
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districts.  Most governmental programs are managed at the administrative zone level.  However, 
the original Forest Act focused on forest management at the district level.  Each of Nepal’s 
districts now has a District Forest Officer (DFO) managing forests in his district.  The District 
Forest Officer controls 7 to 9 range posts staffed by rangers and forest guards ("the field staff").  
The field staff implements the directives of the DFO. 
 Forest policy focused on management from the national government until the mid 1970s.  
By then, extensive deforestation led to the consideration of alternative institutional arrangements.  
Donor countries such as Australia, Germany, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States created project offices to increase their involvement in forest management in districts 
where they had a historical relief presence.  The 1976 Amendment to the Forest Act allowed the 
most degraded forests to be managed by local governments.  For two reasons, a very small 
portion of eligible forest area was transferred.13  First, it was difficult to persuade local 
governments to invest in wasteland.  Second, the Department of Forests still owned the land and 
had the right to most returns earned from it.  By 1988, the inadequacy of 1976 amendment was 
well established and almost all forestland was still under the Department of Forests.  During the 
period between 1976 and 1988, project donors gradually increased the interaction between 
projects and district forest offices until project offices took complete responsibility for the 
funding and management of district forest offices in certain districts.14 
 Currently, there are five external aid agencies that have significant control over district 
forest offices.  The Nepali-United Kingdom Community Forestry Project ("NUKCFP") manages 
district forest offices in 4 districts in eastern Nepal and 3 districts in western Nepal.  The Nepali-
Australia Community Forestry Project ("NACFP") operates district forest offices in 2 districts in 
central Nepal.  The Swiss ("SDC") provide assistance for two other central Nepal districts.  
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USAID funds 3 districts in mid-western Nepal, and Germany's GTZ funds 2 districts in the 
eastern Terai region of Nepal.  The Community and Private Forestry Division ("CPFD") of the 
Department of Forests operate the remaining districts that lack project funding.  The CPFD 
receives more general program support from multiple sources including the World Bank and the 
Danish development agency, DANIDA.  Many of the aid agencies running project offices also 
provide some additional program funding to the Department of Forests. 
 In 1988, the Department of Forests recommended that forests be turned over to local 
forest users by creating user groups.  These forest user groups would be allowed to make their 
own management decisions and to keep all the revenue they generate.15  At this point, several 
project offices began to experiment with user group creation on a larger scale.  The actual 
legislation for user groups passed in 1993 and the formal rules implementing the legislation in 
hill and mountain areas of Nepal became effective in 1996.16  The Forest Act of 1993 requires 
that all accessible forestland in Nepal be transferred to local communities through the creation of 
forest user groups.  The Forest Act of 1993 does not cover the Terai, so in general, I do not 
analyze user groups created with funds from GTZ. 
The Forest Act of 1993 describes how forest groups should be created, and one policy 
manual provides the minute detail of how to build forest groups.17  The Forest Act and this 
policy manual presented uniform rules for the creation of forest groups across all of the hill and 
mountain areas of Nepal.  The field staff, under the direction of the District Forest Officer, is 
responsible for following this legislation and rules in creating and monitoring user groups in each 
district.18   The task of generating new community institutions to manage all forestland in Nepal 
is a tremendous task, and the Forest Act requires substantial external support.  The Forest Act 
and operational guidelines create a "blueprint" for the creation of new forest groups that should 
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be the same across Nepal (Varughese 1999).19  Thus, within the law, there is no scope for the 
source of funding in the creation of new user groups to influence the implementation of the 
Forest Act.  Nevertheless, there are several ways that the type and source of aid may still 
influence the resulting institutional environment.  Most obviously, the amount of resources that 
any project devotes to building user groups can vary.  In addition, there are two ways for a 
project to impose its preferences on the groups it creates.  First, projects can choose how to 
interpret the Department of Forests' guidelines in how user groups operate.  Second, projects can 
vary in how they design user groups.  In this study, I do not observe how groups operate, but I 
can consider how vigorously different donors have implemented the Forest Act.  Also, I can 
observe differences in how different donors design these new institutions by considering two 
institutional characteristics: forest area and number of participating households.  
3. Data and Methodology 
 This paper uses data from the Department of Forests' Forest User Group (FUG) Database 
(1997).20    This database is a complete census of all government initiated forest groups in Nepal, 
and it is maintained by the Community and Private Forests Division (CPFD) of the Department 
of Forests.  It contains information on every user group formed in 59 districts of Nepal through 
April 1997. 21  These records document when the user group is formed, where it is formed, how 
much land is transferred to the group, and how many households participate in the group.  The 
remaining districts for which there are not records are Terai districts where the Forest Act does 
not apply (though there are user groups there), some western hill districts where a Maoist 
insurgency limits the operation of many government programs, and the independent Kingdom of 
Mustang.  77% of the forestland in Nepal is in the districts included in the user group census.22  
Because this paper uses the census of forest groups in Nepal and not a sample, the usual 
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sampling with replacement statistical formula are not appropriate.  When I observe differences in 
program implementation or group characteristics across sources of aid, these differences are the 
true differences in the population; they are not artifacts of sampling, because there is no sample. 
Table 1 illustrates the progression of the implementation of the Forest Act through time 
in Nepal.  Column 3 contains the number of new groups each year, and column 4 reports the 
running total of forest groups.  The number of groups accelerates immediately before the passage 
of the Forest Act and increases for each year until the final year of our records.  Central oversight 
of district forest offices is weak, so district offices have a great deal of discretion in how they 
operate.  Consequently, many districts elected to form groups before passage of the law, and 
once it became clear that a law would pass, many districts closely associated with foreign project 
offices elected to begin implementing the act.  By 1997, over 5,000 groups exist in Nepal. 
 The fifth and sixth columns of table 1 contain the total forest area handed over to user 
groups and the number of households in new groups for each year.  Both increase immediately 
before the passage of the official law.  By 1997, user groups manage approximately 10% of the 
forest area in the 59 districts for which I have records.  Also, 24% of households in the 59 
districts are engaged in user groups (71% of households in Nepal are in these 59 districts).23   
 In the remaining sections of this paper, I compare the implementation of the Forest Act 
across sources of funding for the establishment of new user groups.  The type and source of 
official development assistance used to implement the Forest Act does not vary within a district.  
Thus, the analysis in the next section is based on comparing the implementation of the Forest Act 
across districts that are located in potentially different geographic areas.  While working with a 
complete census eliminates any worry about sampling bias in comparing means across sources of 
aid, I am concerned about omitted geographical differences associated with the location of 
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different types and sources of ODA.  Ideally, I would like to observe types and sources of aid 
moving in and out of operation randomly in a given location.  It is unfortunate that there is no 
such variation, because the Forest Act in Nepal is one of the largest scale attempts at a major 
institutional reform, and several other countries are considering similar programs.24  Thus, the 
role of development assistance in the implementation of an institutional reform like the Forest 
Act is of considerable policy interest aside from the academic questions mentioned in the 
introduction.  Absent variation through time in the geographic location of types and sources of 
aid, one possibility is to look for reasonable assumptions that might permit an examination of the 
role of development assistance in program implementation.   
Hence, after comparing sources of aid across districts, I compare the implementation of 
the Forest Act in communities located adjacent to policy change borders.25  A policy change 
border is a district border with different types of official development assistance on each side of 
the border.  My analysis is based on the idea that communities on opposite sides of a policy 
change border are comparable (on average).  Using geographic coordinates, I calculate the 
distance from the population center of each community to a policy change border.  I select 
communities with population centers within ten kilometers of a policy change border.  Choosing 
a distance a few kilometers more or less than ten does not affect the results in this section.  Next, 
I match communities on one side of a policy change border (a “treatment” community) to the 
nearest community on the other side of the policy change border (a “control” community).  If the 
distance between nearest neighbors is greater than fifteen kilometers, the match is not analyzed 
(this eliminates communities without any adjacent neighbor).  I refer to this procedure as 
"geographic matching."  One difficulty with the geographic matching procedure is that the 
selected subpopulation is not necessarily representative of the population as a whole.  Hence, if I 
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observe different properties in neighboring communities than in the across district comparisons, I 
cannot identify the source of this difference.  
Figure 1 shows the results of our geographic matching procedure.  Figure 1 is a map of 
Nepal with district boundaries drawn.  Districts are shaded to indicate the type and source of aid 
responsible for implementing the Forest Act in a given district.  The number of forest groups per 
district appears in bold for each district.  21 districts in Nepal do not have any organization 
designated to assist in the implementation of user groups in these districts.  Most of these 
districts are in areas where the Forest Act does not apply.  Despite the lack of legislative backing, 
there have been experiments with user groups in these areas, and they are pictured in figure 1.  
The dots on the map indicate communities selected with the geographic matching scheme 
outlined in the previous paragraph.  It should be evident from figure 1 that it will not be possible 
to compare every source of assistance in creating forest groups.  For example, in western Nepal, 
it is possible to compare areas funded by USAID to areas receiving project funding from the 
United Kingdom (NUKCFP) or program funding through the CPFD.  However, there are no 
areas where USAID funded areas are adjacent to Swiss (SDC) or Australia (NACFP) funded 
areas.  Thus, one limitation of geographic matching is that it constrains the number of possible 
comparisons.  However, geographic matching identifies the effects of different types of 
assistance if, in expectation, a community on one side of a policy change border differs from its 
nearest neighbor on the other side of a policy change border only by what type of assistance it 
receives in the creation of new forestry institutions.   
4. Aid and Program Implementation 
This section considers variation in the scope of implementation of the forest act across 
types and sources of official development assistance.  I focus on two measures of program 
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implementation: the amount of forestland transferred and the number of households participating 
in user groups.  I also look for evidence that those areas that are currently lagging behind in 
program implementation are likely to catch up. 
 Across sources of funding, there is substantial variation in the fraction of forestland that 
has been transferred to user groups by 1997 and in the fraction of households involved in user 
groups.  This variation appears in figures 2 and 3.  Figure 2 shows the percentage of forestland 
transferred to user groups per district, ranging from a low of less than one percent of forest area 
in a district in far western Nepal to almost forty percent of forest area in a central Nepal district.  
On average, districts funded by the U.K. have transferred 18% of their forestland to user groups 
by 1997.  This is more than districts receiving any other type of assistance.  The next highest 
fraction of land transferred is for districts funded by program aid to the CPFD.  On average, 8% 
of forestland has been transferred in those districts.  Districts receiving aid from other sources of 
project funding have transferred a slightly lower fraction of their forestland.  These district totals 
are based on a census of forest user groups and hence are not subject to variability from 
sampling; the almost 10% difference between NUKCFP project areas and CPFD areas represent 
the actual difference between these areas. 
 Figure 3 looks at the fraction of households in a district participating in a forest user 
group by the type of aid.  These numbers appear substantially more variable than the fraction of 
forest area transferred.  In some (low population) districts, almost 90% of households are in user 
groups. Several other districts report 10% or less of households in forest user groups.  I cannot 
distinguish between rural and urban households in the data, so a part of this variation 
undoubtedly owes to differences in urban and rural populations although most of Nepal’s 
population outside of the Terai and Kathmandu is rural.26  Nevertheless, the differences 
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associated with the type and source of aid are striking.  59% of households in NUKCFP areas are 
in user groups compared with 32% of households in areas funded by program aid to the CPFD.   
These across district differences in the scope of program implementation are also evident 
when I consider adjacent communities.  Table 2 looks differences in forestland transferred in 
adjacent communities and table 3 looks at the number of participating households.  All 
geographic matching tables follow the same structure as table 2.  The rows are the policy 
treatment and the columns are the comparison group.  A given cell contains the average 
difference between the cell value for a community on the treatment side of the policy border and 
the cell value for its nearest neighbor community on the control side of the policy border.  Thus, 
for the n communities in a district managed by i that I compare to nearest neighbors in a district 
managed by j, the value in cell (i,j) for a given characteristic C is: 
( )
1
1 n
ki kj
k
C C
n =
−∑ . 
Because I do not observe every possible set of comparisons, there are blank cells in table 2.  
Also, table 2 is not constrained to be symmetric.  Each community in a treatment area does not 
need to match to a unique community in the comparison area.   
Each cell in table 2 contains mean differences in total area transferred to user groups 
(April 1997) between communities on policy change borders.   As in figure 2, districts receiving 
project funding from the U.K. appear to be leaders in the transfer of forestland.  Communities in 
NUKCFP funded districts have received substantially more forestland than adjacent communities 
funded by USAID or funded by program aid.  Likewise, when I look at adjacent communities, 
the Swiss appear much more aggressive in implementing the reform (this was not apparent in 
figure 2).  In contrast, communities where the Forest Act is funded by either the NACFP or 
USAID lag behind their neighbors.  Table 3 compares the number of households per community 
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participating in forest groups.  The image of implementation in table 2 also appears in Table 3.  
Both NUKCFP and SDC areas have involved more households than their neighbors, and USAID 
communities have substantially fewer households involved in forest groups.  
A natural question in this discussion about differences in the scope of program 
implementation is whether lagging groups may catch up through time with the donors who have 
been more aggressive in implementing the Forest Act.  By September 1997, the transfer of 
forestland to user groups has been ongoing for over four years, but there is no end date for the 
transfer of forestland in the Forest Act.  Figure 4 pictures, by source of assistance, the probability 
a group forms in a given district in a given month.  The regression lines are from local 
regressions of an indicator for if a group forms against a time trend for each of the projects 
separately.27  The greater number of forest groups in NUKCFP areas is immediately evident in 
Figure 4.  Areas funded by Australia were initially leaders in the formation of forest groups 
although the rate of formation in NACFP areas never accelerates as it did in NUKCFP areas.  
Figure 5 plots the derivative of the estimated regression function with respect to time for each of 
the projects.  In NUKCFP districts, the change in the probability a group forms is higher until the 
end of the data set when it declines.  There is no evidence that I might expect other project areas 
to catch up.  The change in the probability of a new group forming is negative throughout all 
project areas by the most recent time period. 
5. Aid and the Characteristics of New Institutions 
There is a vast case-study literature on the determinants of successful common property 
resource management.28  The size of the resource being managed and the number of participants 
are both important attributes that influence a group's ability to manage a resource.  Dahal (1994) 
analyzes seven case studies of forest groups in eastern Nepal.29  He emphasizes that the ideal 
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number of households per group varies with local conditions, but in general groups with more 
than 100 households have difficulty protecting the land, making group decisions, and 
implementing group decisions.  Likewise, the ideal size of forest area to be transferred varies 
with the local environment.  The forest area transferred to a forest group needs to be small 
enough that the group can protect and manage it, but large enough that the forest boundaries are 
clearly defined and the users perceive the forest’s importance to them.  Dahal observes 
substantial operational problems in groups with small forests (less than 10ha) and one group with 
an extremely large forest (greater than 300ha).  Chhetri and Pandey (1992) report a similar set of 
findings in their review of case studies from experimental forest groups in two districts in far-
western Nepal.30 
 Table 4 summarizes the mean and standard deviations of the univariate distributions of 
individual group characteristics.  I focus on the two group characteristics reported in the FUG 
census: hectares transferred to a user group and number of households per group.  Groups built 
by funding from the U.K. are smaller than groups built with program funding.  On average, a 
user group in an NUKCFP project area manages 61 hectares with 93 households.  In contrast, 
groups in areas funded with program aid span 70 hectares with 105 households.  Thus, user 
groups in NUKCFP areas on average contain 12% fewer households, spanning 14% less area.  
Areas funded by the SDC (91 hectares, 120 households) and USAID (84 hectares, 138 
households) form the largest groups.  Groups have the smallest land area on average in NACFP 
areas (31 hectares). 
A main insight from the case study literature on group characteristics is that the joint 
distribution of characteristics matter a great deal.  A small group managing a large amount of 
land may have difficulty as will a large group managing a small area of land.  Hence, our focus 
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should be on the joint distribution of group characteristics rather than the univariate distributions 
in table 4.  Figure 6 presents contours based on the joint density of hectares per group and the 
number of households per group by the type and source of assistance received in creating a 
group.31  The density estimate for each contour is labeled on the graph.  Forest user groups 
created by project funding from the U.K. have a mass more tightly compacted around fifteen 
households and fifty hectares of forestland.  Overall the joint distributions of group 
characteristics look similar for groups created with program aid and with project aid from the 
U.K, although the center of the mass is more diffuse in groups funded by program aid suggesting 
greater variety in user group attributes in CPFD areas.  Other sources of project aid present 
remarkably different pictures.  Groups constructed with funding from Australia look most similar 
to groups created with program funding or with project funding from the U.K.  One obvious 
difference is that NACFP created groups tend to keep a relatively small number of households 
and have a smaller fraction of households per hectare by adding larger land areas.  Swiss funded 
districts are immediately adjacent to Australia funded districts, but the mass of the SDC funded 
distribution is towards more households and more hectares of forestland.  Similarly groups 
created by the USAID and GTZ tend to vary substantially more in their characteristics than 
groups created with program aid.  Both USAID and GTZ areas also have substantially more 
mass towards larger groups in both characteristics.  
   In tables 5 and 6, I consider the properties of user groups in adjacent communities.  I am 
limited to the comparison groups where there exist user groups in both (treatment and control) 
matched communities.  Some of the comparisons in tables 2 and 3 are not possible in table 5 and 
6, because some treatment and comparison areas do not have any user groups.  The results in 
tables 5 and 6 are similar to what I observed when aggregating over all districts in table 4.  On 
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average, user groups in areas funded by project aid from the United Kingdom span fewer 
hectares (table 5) and contain fewer households (table 6).  In the NUKCFP – CPFD comparison, 
the CPFD control group has on average 105 households covering 63 hectares per forest group.  
In contrast, the NUKCFP treatment group has 12% fewer households who manage forests that 
are 30% smaller.  User groups funded by NACFP tend to span a smaller forest area than do 
groups created by either their Swiss or program aid funded neighbors.  However, NACFP funded 
groups tend to have a larger number of members.  This result from comparing neighbors is the 
opposite of what I found in the across district comparison.  Swiss funded groups tend to cover a 
larger area than their CPFD neighbors, but involve a smaller number of households. 
If communities on opposite sides of a policy change border are similar in their latent 
characteristics affecting group size and forest area, tables 5 and 6 suggest that NUKCFP area 
user groups manage smaller areas with fewer households than the user groups would manage if 
they were created by the CPFD.  The local public good management problems faced by user 
groups are likely to be less in the smaller institutions (Wade 1987).32  Fewer households make 
coordination and cooperation between members easier.  Smaller forests are easier to protect and 
maintain.  The mean forest size in NUKCFP treatment areas is likely still large enough (44.1 
hectares) that user group members may perceive a payoff to maintaining it (Dahal 1994).33  Of 
course, fewer households in a group might also mean that more actual forest users are excluded 
from the group.34 
The results from geographic matching show that the district aggregates in figures 1 and 2 
as well as table 4 may hide some omitted differences between districts.  However, the largest 
differences in the district aggregates are also evident when comparing geographic neighbors.  
The Forest Act of 1993 has been implemented much more aggressively in areas receiving project 
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aid from the United Kingdom.  The Swiss have been aggressive overall, but they create groups 
with more land per household than the SDC's neighbors.  USAID funded groups also contain 
more land per household than its neighbors, but in contrast to the Swiss, USAID appears less 
aggressive in implementing the reform overall.  These differences across funding sources in the 
realization of the Forest Act may affect the success of this institutional reform for at least three 
reasons.  First, group characteristics may affect the success or failure of these new local 
institutions.  The observed variation in program implementation could still be beneficial if it 
allowed for experimentation and learning across forest user groups in an environment where 
optimal group characteristics are unknown.  However, user groups established under the 1993 
transfer of forestland are permanent.  At the current stage of implementation, there is little 
prospect for adapting institutions based on learning or experimentation.35  Second, the 
unevenness in reform implementation may impact resource management within Nepal.  In the 
analogous case of privatization, Runge (1986) points out that uncertainty over the management 
regime accelerates speculative resource destruction.36  Third, the observed variation in the extent 
of program implementation across districts may lead to the incomplete transfer of land, because 
the rate of user group formation is decreasing through time.  Picciotto (1997) suggests that 
incomplete implementation is a primary cause of the failure of many institutional reforms in 
developing countries.37  As reasons, Picciotto highlights both the difficulty of formulating policy 
with heterogeneous institutional environments and the failure of incomplete reforms to generate 
political capital for support.  Thus, the apparent differences in the scope of implementation of the 
Forest Act and in the characteristics of the newly created institution across type and source of 
ODA may affect the long-term success of the reform. 
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6. Conclusion 
This paper has considered how different sources and types of official development 
assistance affect the implementation of a large-scale institutional reform.  Characteristics of 
newly established institutions vary with the type (program, project) and source of assistance used 
in creating these institutions.  One donor of project aid appears substantially more aggressive in 
implementing the reform than anyone else, and the characteristics of the new institutions created 
by this aid source are more in line with the conventional wisdom about the optimal 
characteristics of these institutions. 
 The findings of this paper suggest two broad areas for future research.  First, mechanisms 
for funding and implementing government programs and institutional reforms need to be 
considered in both policy formulation and evaluation.  This paper began with the hypothesis that 
donor countries prefer to provide project aid when they have different preferences than the aid 
recipient government regarding the use of funding.  I show that institutions created under project 
aid vary by project from institutions created with program aid.  If I neglected the different 
sources and types of aid, I may draw misleading conclusions about the operation of institutions 
discussed in this study.  Clearly, the impact of sources of implementation funding on program 
evaluation deserves further study.  In addition, there are efficiency, optimality, and ethical 
questions raised by the heterogeneity in program implementation observed in this paper.  These 
questions merit further discussion and consideration. 
Second, more academic attention could be directed to aid flows within countries. The 
types of questions asked in cross-country studies about the objectives of aid and who benefits 
from aid seem equally relevant within a country.  Further, there may be an advantage to studying 
these questions within rather than across countries.  In general, cross-country studies of aid flows 
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encounter very difficult estimation problems (Trumbull and Wall 1994).38  This paper shows the 
feasibility of studying the allocation of aid within countries.  The advantage of within country 
analysis is the ability to address to the omitted variable problem with program evaluation tools 
such as the geographic matching used in this study.  After controlling for unobserved differences 
in the physical location of within country aid recipients that receive different types of assistance, 
this paper shows that scale of program implementation and characteristics of new institutions 
vary with the type and source of development assistance.  Thus, factors other than recipient need 
impact within country assistance. In their cross-country study, Burnside and Dollar (2000) 
suggest conditioning development assistance on the type and quality of policies and institutions 
in a country.39  By studying the role of aid in the implementation of one institutional innovation, 
this paper illustrates that aid can impact the policies and institutions that exist within a country.  
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Table 1: New Forest User Groups Per Year 
Year 
(Gregorian) (Nepali) 
# of New 
Groups 
Total # of 
Groups 
New Area 
Handed Over 
Households 
in New 
Groups 
1984 2040 5 5 423 669 
1989 2045 6 11 288 478 
1990 2046 36 47 576 3,201 
1991 2047 44 91 2,160 6,250 
1992 2048 104 195 5,227 10,668 
1993 2049 565 760 30,477 62,247 
1994 2050 1014 1774 63,791 103,307 
1995 2051 1281 3055 81,832 136,083 
1996 2052 1417 4472 99,755 144,584 
1997 2053 838 5310 70,894 97,174 
source: Department of Forest's Forest User Group Database, Sept. 1997.  Year totals are through the end of 
the Nepali calendar which corresponds to mid April of the Gregorian Year. 
 
Table 2: Differences Between Neighbors in Total Area Transferred to User Groups 
      Control       
Treatment CPFD NUKCFP NACFP SDC USAID GTZ 
CPFD  -71.4 139.3 -143.2 97.4 927.2 
NUKCFP 94.5    65.9  
NACFP -47.6   -66.2   
SDC 122.9  120.2    
USAID -234.4 -127.3     
GTZ -1571.0      
Each cell contains the average of the difference in total forest area transferred per community in 
April 1997 between each selected community in the treatment group and its nearest neighbor in 
the control group.  Only 1 USAID treatment community matches to a NUKCFP Control 
community. 
 
Table 3: Differences Between Neighbors in Number of Households in User Groups 
      Control       
Treatment CPFD NUKCFP NACFP SDC USAID GTZ 
CPFD  -130.9 91.2 -93.2 145.7 766.8 
NUKCFP 123.9    200.7  
NACFP 41.7   -90.4   
SDC 144.4  201    
USAID -277.7 -315     
GTZ -1336.5      
Each cell contains the average of the difference in total households in forest groups per 
community in April 1997 between each selected community in the treatment group and its nearest 
neighbor in the control group.   
 
Table 4: Individual User Group Characteristics by Project, April 1997 
Project 
Number of 
Groups 
Hectares Per 
Group 
Households Per 
Group 
CPFD 3481 70.2 105.3 
  (124.8) (92.3) 
NUKCFP 1192 60.7 93.0 
  (92.4) (72.8) 
NACFP 185 30.8 110.0 
  (41.4) (103.1) 
SDC 147 91.4 119.5 
  (103.3) (94.2) 
USAID 336 83.8 137.5 
  (134.3) (147.9) 
GTZ 49 73.3 116.8 
  (137.1) (106.1) 
Project office and user group characteristics are from the Forest  
User Group Database (1997).  Columns two and three contain the 
Average of each characteristic computed by project office. 
Standard deviations are in parenthesis. 
 
Table 5: Differences Between Area Transferred Per Group 
      Control       
Treatment CPFD NUKCFP NACFP SDC USAID GTZ 
CPFD  11.9 19.8 22.3 53.6  
NUKCFP -18.9      
NACFP -11.8   -8.8   
SDC 17.0      
USAID 3.1      
GTZ            
Each cell contains the average area transferred per user group in a treatment community minus 
average area transferred per user group in the treatment communities nearest neighbor across a 
policy change border, averaged over all the communities in the cell (April 1997). 
 
Table 6: Differences Between Households Per Group 
      Control       
Treatment CPFD NUKCFP NACFP SDC USAID GTZ 
CPFD  25.7 -8.5 63.9 1.5  
NUKCFP -12.1       
NACFP 30.8   51.3   
SDC -10.0      
USAID -12.5      
GTZ       
Each cell contains the average number of households per user group in a treatment community 
minus average number of households per user group in the treatment communities nearest 
neighbor across a policy change border averaged over all the communities in the cell (April 1997). 
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Figure 4: Probability of New FUG Forming on Time by IGO
(local regression)
Figure 5: Change in Probability of New FUG Forming by IGO
(derivative of local regression)
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Figure 6: Joint Density of Households per Forest User Group and Forestland per Forest User Group by Project
A. CPFD B. NUKCFP C. NACFP
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Forest group characteristics from the Forest User Group Database (1997).  Pictures are contour maps of the joint density of the area transferred per forest group
and the number of households per group.  Joint densities are kernel estimates using a Gaussian kernel and bandwidths selected by Silverman (1986).  Each
contour is labeled with the estimated density.
